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of war do we want – provided we want a war? Public opinion, at least in democracies, 
should have something to say concerning this question. While political realism makes it 
necessary to take the existence of cyberwarfare as given and to ask whether and how 
ethical limits can and should be drawn, we should also be able to step back and ask 
whether it would not be better to renounce cyberwarfare completely. While cyberwarfare 
might have the potential to lead to destructionless wars, it also has the potential to 
initiate massive destruction. As such, it is a two-edged sword. and in addition to asking 
the pragmatic question “What can we do in order to reduce the risk of using the destruc-
tive side of the sword?” we should also take time to ask the fundamental question “Do 
we want a (new) double-edged sword at all?”
Norbert Campagna
Université du Luxembourg 
Dale Dorsey. The Limits of Moral Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016. 233 pp.
In his book on the normative authority of morality, Dale Dorsey addresses the conflict 
between the ‘plausible’ intuition that morality requires universal ‘impartiality’ to override 
personal interests (PMI) and the implications of such requirements that go against our 
other rational views. Is the ‘moral standpoint’ mandatory for us at all times and in every 
circumstance? The burden seems overwhelming. This is ‘the question’, stated as an 
attempt to establish the relationship between acting according to moral requirements 
and how one ought to live. The more famous of the objections that he addresses is 
known as the ‘demandingness objection’. Similar in content are the cases in which 
morality understood as ‘reason-as-such’ stumble into other (moral or non-moral) reasons 
in favour of the ‘dearest and nearest’. The Limits of Moral Authority offers a broad pre-
sentation of practical rationality and morality, however, which is more consistent than 
the mere sum of its arguments.
The perplexity facing the (excessive) demands of moral requirements already 
guided Dorsey’s inquiry to some extent in his previous book (The Basic Minimum: 
A Welfarist Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). He raises questions 
such as: given two smaller communities, one faring well and another struck by famine, 
which one should society help? Why is it so clear that it ought to help the community 
that is worse off? Why should all other considerations be discarded? The ‘demanding-
ness objection’ was also the main question in the author’s paper “Weak Anti-Rationalism 
and the Demands of Morality” (Noûs 46/1 [2012]: 1-23). In this new volume, the question 
(with many of its ramifications) comes to the foreground, superseding political or social 
problems, even those that keep him awake at night (does his weak anti-rationalism not 
justify ‘jerks’ and the selfish wealthy in following their whims and discard any moral 
demands entirely?).
The question of practical (moral) conflicts is presented as follows: “My family and I 
have agreed to take a group vacation […]. The time has come to book our tickets. But 
— 149 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 1
book reviews
before we can do so, a natural disaster strikes an extraordinarily impoverished country, 
leaving hundreds of thousands of people homeless […]. My own view is that doing 
something to help is morally required. [… but to] cancel now would be the worst sort 
of disappointment. After all, my family and I really want to go. Also, it’s something I 
feel I owe them” (1).
The picture is sketched in this somewhat pedestrian way in the introduction – if 
compared, for example, to Max Weber’s despair in the face of the choice between sav-
ing one’s soul or the city, or Isaiah Berlin’s values conflict. Although the reductio ad 
Hitlerum (Hitler, Sartre’s apathy and the justifications of a Nazi gatekeeper surface several 
times) eventually finds its place in the book, the tone is never of a deep inner struggle 
between the demands of universal morality and the fragility of goodness. Moreover, 
‘prudential’ considerations also take the ‘virtue’ of prudence as a shallow calculation 
between self-interest and ‘common good’. Given these platitudes, the book’s presenta-
tion (or its beginning) is not at first glance promising.
Even more surprising, however, is the author’s hasty use of a brief definition/
description to solve the dichotomy between facts and values that has plagued morality 
and political life since Hume’s dilemma (18) or Kant’s ‘stratagem’ (213 ff.): morality is 
just one among several possible standpoints. “In its most basic distillation, a standpoint 
takes as inputs certain facts about a given action, assigns a particular importance (or 
‘strength’) to these facts, and generates an evaluative output: an assignment of ‘good,’ 
‘bad,’ ‘required,’ ‘permissible,’ etc., to the action in question” (9).
There are, however, two powerful reasons to read carefully what is otherwise a 
remarkably well-thought out and organized book, full of roadmaps, signposts, summaries, 
and conclusions.
On one hand, the puzzle is a real one, at the very least from a subjective perspective: 
“When trying to decide whether to take a family vacation or not, I consider not just 
morality, but also prudence, etiquette, and norms of friendship and family. Each of these 
picks out a distinct standpoint of normative inquiry” (9).
Obviously, it is tempting for this reviewer to let the author (and his family) go 
on vacation, and even encourage Lee, Chris and many others fictitious characters to 
pay for their sons’ costly top-notch high school or college instead of donating their 
money to Oxfam (the recurrent dilemma afflicting many people in the book). In other 
words, to dismiss these rather shallow inner struggles as merely artificial conflicts, 
taking the view that moral permissions and duties should always take supremacy, there-
fore fully endorsing what the author calls ‘moral rationalism’. Or even to uphold a 
theory that is closer to the author’s heart, namely Douglas W. Portmore’s defence of 
mild consequentialism (Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): moral rationalism sets constraints on moral 
theories, and some forms of act-consequentialism may be incorporated in practical 
reason in a way that does not violate such constraints. But is it that easy to reconcile 
all these viewpoints or is this attempt at dismissal not merely a distorted view of 
human morality and even a contradiction in terms – as Isaiah Berlin, for example, 
contends?
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It is very tempting, nevertheless, to defuse these apparent conflicts and discard the 
main thesis of the book with them, especially because among the many arguments 
debated and accepted or rejected as ‘plausible’ or ‘non-plausible’, some theories do 
explain the specific conflict/contradictions under examination. Samuel Scheffler’s ‘par-
tiality’ (“Morality and Reasonable Partiality.” In Partiality and Impartiality. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1994, 100-107), Brian Barry’s not so demanding ‘impartiality’ (Justice as Impar-
tiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 191), and the double meaning of morality 
as either a set of basic rules and an ideal of excellence in behaviour (James Dreier. 
“Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t.” In Satisficing and 
Maximizing. Edited by Michael Byron, 131-154 [149]. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) are among the theories that are too hastily dismissed.
On the other hand, this is a challenging book, full of interesting arguments and 
very readable, notwithstanding (or because of) the evidently impressive scholarship in 
recent analytical moral theory (with the occasional reference to a classical book thrown 
in). Chapter 1 is devoted to clarifying the concepts the author uses throughout the book, 
and it is apparently a mere ‘stage-setter’. But while anticipating the objection that there 
is no independent notion of practical rationality (based on Copps’s normative pluralism), 
he in fact argues that there is reason for accepting the sui generis normative standpoint 
of ‘reason-as-such’, from which the unscripted ought is the result (39). Chapter 2 
addresses the problem of the method in moral inquiry and attacks a priori moral rational-
ism, that is, the view that moral considerations are supreme and a limiting condition 
(‘thou shall not kill, period’) and that if we take all moral considerations seriously, there 
is no theoretical conflict. His purpose is to contrast it with ‘substantive rationalism’ that 
entails an analysis of the reasons for action, dismissing in passing some criticisms of the 
famous defence of anti-rationalism by Philippa Foot. In chapters 3 and 4 Dorsey puts 
forward the core of his vision: there is good reason for accepting “[…] an impartial, and 
hence demanding, theory of morality” (70); but there is also a ground for the denial of 
the ‘supremacy’ of the moral standpoint (as in Thomas Nagel, 207-210) and therefore 
moral anti-rationalism is the best way to ‘accommodate’ the existence of heroic actions 
that are not normatively implied or required on grounds of how one should live, called 
‘supererogatory actions’ (70). The more controversial points are made in chapters 5 and 
6, where the author maintains that it is not irrational not to follow moral norms. He falls 
short of Bernard Williams’s position – we would be “better off without” (86) –, but 
morality for Dorsey is merely a set of ‘by default’ reasons (or permissions) for action 
and we possess a “[…] capacity to strengthen practical reasons” through the “normative 
significance of the self” (173-180). This theory is also presented in the paper “Ground-
ing, Priority, and the Normative Significance of Self” (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 
10/1 [2016]: 1-24), but ignores an obvious alternative: with due apologies to Jean-Paul, 
Sartre behaved as a selfish brat and he is merely excusing himself, claiming a political 
stance he never upholds – but certainly later hyper-compensated navigating the ‘wave 
of the future’.
The assumption that pervades the book is that morality is independent of human 
desires and ends: “[…] whatever theory of practical reasons is true will allow us to 
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determine the first order of content of normativity on the basis of a reflective equilib-
rium of our considered judgments concerning how we should live” (6; fully clarified in 
the appendix “FYO”). Defining morality as impartiality and henceforth using the reflec-
tive equilibrium as a method ignoring the appeal to a view of the moral person is the 
deep reason why Dorsey’s conclusion is to some extent unavoidable.
If one puts forward the standards or demands of morality as a form of moral 
constructivism in the attempt to avoid any ideal conception of personhood, naturally 
something is amiss in the relationship between the morality standpoint and normative 
authority.
Despite similarities in terminology, this is not Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. 
When Rawls presents the aim of his Dewey Lectures in 1980, he begins by saying that 
he merely wishes to examine the notion of a “constructivist moral conception” (John 
Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism.” In Collected Papers, 303. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), although one of a specific kind: a Kantian constructivism, although he 
acknowledges that “[…] justice as fairness is not, plainly, Kant’s view, strictly speaking” 
(1999, 304). Rawls is using the qualification ‘Kantian’ as an analogy and not quite as an 
accurate interpretation, but he still wants it to resemble Kant’s fundamental aspects 
(1999, 304-305). He ventures to do so because constructivism is much less well under-
stood than “utilitarianism, perfectionism, and intuitionism” (303). Indeed, in the third 
lecture Rawls presents how a Kantian doctrine “[…] interprets the notion of objectivity 
in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view” (1999, 340), following Henry 
Sidgwick’s efforts to build a method of ethics that he considers the first truly consistent 
work in modern moral theory (1999, 341). Yet, Rawls still points out two important 
limitations to Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics: firstly, Sidgwick pays little attention to the 
notion of ‘personhood’ and the social importance of morality; and secondly, Sidgwick 
fails to recognize that both Kant’s doctrine as well as perfectionism have a distinctive 
ethical method. Both Kantian doctrine and moral perfectionism are much more than a 
formal account of the principles of equity; both include a view of the moral person 
(1999, 342).
Perhaps a view of moral personhood, its purposes and desires, can only be 
entirely ignored at the cost of concluding in the end, as Dorsey argues, that we are 
not always required and even permitted (in all circumstances, or all-things-considered) 
to act morally according to the reason-as-such standpoint. This is a strong conclusion 
– a bold claim that is in practice prey to all (moral and non-moral) justifications for 
action and inaction – akin to the full-fledged subjectivism that he seeks to avoid with 
a ‘default’ PMI. He does not go as far as eschewing morality, but may turn us all 
into ‘budding utilitarians’ in a final attempt to evade subjectivism. This was the pur-
pose of David Brink’s paper: “Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View” 
(The Journal of Philosophy 83/8 [1986]: 417-438), which ironically was seminal to this 
book.
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